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The Mark of Policing:
Race and Criminal Records
Eisha Jain*
Abstract. This Essay argues that racial reckoning in policing should include a racial
reckoning in the use of criminal records. Arrests alone—regardless of whether they result
in convictions—create criminal records. Yet because the literature on criminal records
most often focuses on prisoner reentry and on the consequences of criminal conviction,
it is easy to overlook the connections between policing decisions and collateral
consequences. This Essay employs the sociological framework of marking to show how
criminal records entrench racial inequality stemming from policing. The marking
framework recognizes that the government creates a negative credential every time it
creates a record of arrest as well as conviction. Such records, in turn, trigger cascading
consequences for employment, housing, immigration, and a host of other areas. The
credentialing process matters because it enables and conceals race-based discrimination,
and because a focus on the formal sentence often renders this discrimination invisible.
This Essay considers how adopting a credentialing framework offers a way to surface,
and ultimately to address, how race-based policing leaves lasting marks on over-policed
communities.
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Introduction
This Essay considers how a moment of racial reckoning in policing could
include a focus on criminal records. In the summer of 2020, the killings of
George Floyd and Breonna Taylor—coming on the heels of numerous other
documented incidents of police violence against racial minorities—triggered a
historic social movement in the United States.1 One important insight from
this movement is that the most visible forms of police violence represent only
the tip of the iceberg. Police violence is neither unpredictable nor episodic. It is
the product of a legal system that gives the police enormous control over
communities of color.
This Essay, part of the Stanford Law Review’s Policing, Race, and Power
Symposium and of the cross-journal Reckoning and Reformation Symposium,
seeks to draw a connection among policing practices, criminal records, and
racial inequality. There is a large and growing literature focusing on “collateral
consequences,” but courts have tended not to connect these consequences to
arrest practices.2 That may be because collateral consequences tend to be
associated with conviction or with the reentry of former prisoners. But
collateral consequences arise from custodial criminal arrest as well as
conviction.3 Treating collateral consequences that affect reentry as
1. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest

Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/H7DW-KH3J
(estimating that 15 to 26 million people participated in protests in the summer of 2020);
Dylan Lovan, Louisville Protests Continue in Breonna Taylor’s Name, AP NEWS (Sept. 27,
2020), https://perma.cc/Q848-RJ4V (to locate, click “View the live page”).
2. There is a wide-ranging literature discussing unjustified collateral consequences of
criminal convictions, one that is too voluminous to catalogue here. For selected
contributions, see generally Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and
Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 678-80 (2008); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death:
Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012)
(comparing collateral consequences to a form of punishment known as “civil death”);
Brian M. Murray, Retributivist Reform of Collateral Consequences, 52 CONN. L. REV. 863,
916 (2020); Brian M. Murray, Are Collateral Consequences Deserved?, 95 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1031, 1063 (2020) (analyzing collateral consequences from a retributivist
perspective of desert); and Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 463 (2010)
(engaging in a comparative analysis of collateral consequences in the United States and
other countries with similar criminal punishment practices and arguing that the
“severity of collateral consequences in the United States is rooted in racial
marginalization and the narrow dignity interests afforded to individuals with criminal
records in the United States.”).
3. For some of my own thinking on this subject, see Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67
STAN. L. REV. 809, 826 (2015) [hereinafter Jain, Arrests] (explaining how arrests alone,
even in the absence of conviction, trigger penalties in areas such as immigration,
employment, public housing, and social services). See also Eisha Jain, Proportionality and
Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953, 963 (2018) [hereinafter Jain,
footnote continued on next page
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paradigmatic limits our understanding of the reach of criminal records and
their relationship to policing decisions.
This Essay employs the sociological concept of marking to recognize how
policing decisions entrench racial inequality.4 A marking framework treats an
arrest or conviction as a form of public credentialing. The credentialing
process matters because it translates a particular experience into a formally
recognized status. For example, an individual could receive a world-class
education through her public library, but without the credential of a degree,
she would struggle to formalize that knowledge and demonstrate its value.
Similarly, a criminal record formalizes the experience of being arrested. It
translates a single police officer’s decision to arrest into a marker that has
lasting social meaning.
Framing a criminal record as a negative credential offers a way to visualize
more expansive legal interventions than focusing on convictions alone. The
key questions under a marking framework relate to why, when, and how
negative credentials are made and used. The credentialing framework also
reveals that not all credentials have the same social meaning. Racial minorities
who are the most likely to be subject to criminal arrest may also experience
more lasting consequences from their marks.
Proportionality] (explaining how punishments for misdemeanor arrests and convictions
can be grossly disproportionate once civil penalties are taken into account); Eisha Jain,
Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1391-95 (2018) (discussing how
collateral consequences contribute to overcriminalization); Eisha Jain, The Interior
Structure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1477 (2019) (discussing how
linking removal to the criminal-arrest process affects immigration enforcement);
Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L. J. 1206-07 (2016) (discussing
how prior records of arrest affect plea bargaining); Eisha Jain, Jailhouse Immigration
Screening, 70 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1725-31 (2021) (showing how linking immigration
screening to criminal arrest leads to extended carceral treatment within the criminal
justice system in service of immigration control).
4. Literature in law and sociology has developed an account of how criminal records
function as a “credential” or “mark.” See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL
RECORD 2 (2015) (comparing a criminal record to a “negative curriculum vitae” that
“contains only disreputable information”); James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The
Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
177, 177 & n.3 (2008); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937,
939, 942 (2003); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF
MASS INCARCERATION 4-5 (2007) [hereinafter PAGER, MARKED] (arguing that in the
context of criminal convictions, the “power of the credential lies in its recognition as
an official and legitimate means of evaluating and classifying individuals”); see also
Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class
Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 156, 165 (2004) (discussing how
“[h]istorically, going to prison was a marker of extreme deviance, reserved for violent
and incorrigible offenders,” but that it has turned into a common life marker for lowsocioeconomic-status Black men, which leads to diminished life opportunity); James B.
Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
387, 413 (2006).
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This Essay discusses how a marking framework can be employed to create
a more expansive vocabulary for recognizing and beginning to redress the role
of racial discrimination in criminal records. It proceeds as follows. Part I
situates the analysis in the context of racialized police violence. Part II shifts
from racial discrimination in policing to racial discrimination in the use of
criminal records. Part III considers how a credentialing framework could apply
to criminal records, and it discusses possibilities for reform.
I.

Race and the Discretion to Arrest

In the summer of 2020, seventeen-year-old Darnella Frazier recorded
police officer Derek Chauvin killing George Floyd by kneeling on his neck.5
The video raised obvious questions about the abuse of government power.
Why did the officer use such excessive force? Why did none of the observing
officers intervene? Why was Mr. Floyd even subjected to a full custodial arrest
for such a minor violation—allegedly paying for cigarettes with a counterfeit
$20 bill?6
The record of Mr. Floyd’s last moments is far from alone in raising these
questions. A large body of scholarship conceptualizes police violence as a
problem of law.7 Constitutional doctrine gives police significant discretion to
engage in stops and arrests. In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that police officers may make pretextual traffic stops motivated by racial
profiling, so long as there is probable cause for the underlying offense.8 In
Terry v. Ohio, the Court held that police may briefly engage in a stop as long as
the police officer has “reasonable” suspicion that “criminal activity may be
5. Joshua Nevett, George Floyd: The Personal Cost of Filming Police Brutality, BBC NEWS

(June 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/Y5GG-PLUM; Sarah Mervosh & Nicholas BogelBurroughs, Why Derek Chauvin Was Charged with Third-Degree Murder, N.Y. TIMES
(updated June 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/G4A3-GDLC; Laurel Wamsley, Derek
Chauvin Found Guilty of George Floyd’s Murder, NPR (Apr. 20, 2021 5:37 PM ET),
https://perma.cc/EE2P-PL7Z.
6. Matt Furber, Audra D.S. Burch, & Frances Robles, What Happened in the Chaotic
Moments Before George Floyd Died, N.Y. TIMES (updated June 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/
2KM8-AAAJ.
7. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Atwater and the Misdemeanor Carceral State, 133 HARV. L.
REV. F. 147, 151 (2020) (“[W]hen the Supreme Court elevates carceral values over
individual liberty and privacy, it puts its thumb on the scale in favor of punitive and
inegalitarian police practices.”); Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police)
Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1791-93 (2020) (“A combined municipal-state-federal
legal architecture permits routine police violence by granting police discretion over
when and how to arrest or deploy force . . . .”).
8. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817-18 (1996); see also Alexandra Natapoff, A
Stop Is Just a Stop: Terry’s Formalism, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 113, 114 (2017); Devon W.
Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1033 (2002).
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afoot.”9 Beyond stops, police may make full custodial arrests for conduct as
minor as a seatbelt violation that is not punishable by jail time, as the Court
held in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.10 The Court in Atwater justified its decision
by pointing to historic practice, as well as to the presence of other institutional
constraints on the arrest process, reasoning that if police made manifestly
unfair or gratuitous arrests, “political accountability” or “good sense” would
ultimately serve as checks on police behavior.11
All too often, “good sense” and “political accountability” fail to check police
misconduct, including racial profiling. Black and Latino men are
disproportionately subject to criminal arrest.12 Overwhelmingly, arrests are
for low-level offenses.13 Low-level arrests in particular reflect socioracial
disparities in policing practices more than a reasoned response to moral
culpability. As Jamelia Morgan has discussed, hundreds of thousands of
disorderly-conduct arrests each year function as a way of “reinforc[ing] social
hierarchies based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and disability.”14
9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 19-30 (1968). For criticisms of Terry, see, for example, Paul

10.
11.

12.

13.

14.

Butler, “A Long Step Down the Totalitarian Path”: Justice Douglas’s Great Dissent in Terry v.
Ohio, 79 MISS. L.J. 9, 26-29 (2009).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 323, 354 (2001).
Id. at 352-54 (“The upshot of all these influences, combined with the good sense (and,
failing that, the political accountability) of most local lawmakers and law-enforcement
officials, is a dearth of horribles demanding redress.”)
As a general matter, one out of three people will be arrested by age twenty-three. See
Robert Brame, Michael G. Turner, Raymond Paternoster & Shawn D. Bushway,
Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21,
25 (2012). According to one estimate, approximately one in two Black and Hispanic
men will be arrested by age twenty-three. Robert Brame, Shawn D. Bushway, Ray
Paternoster & Michael G. Turner, Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence
by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014). Racial disparities in arrest have
been well-documented in the context of marijuana arrests. See, e.g., Benjamin Mueller,
Using Data to Make Sense of a Racial Disparity in NYC Marijuana Arrests, N.Y. TIMES
(May 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/6FJ4-2WVP (“In the first three months of [2018], 89
percent of the roughly 4,000 people arrested for marijuana possession in New York
City were black or Hispanic.”). Racial disparities also continue in carceral treatment.
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism,
133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (2019) (“Most people sentenced to prison in the United States
today are from politically marginalized groups—poor, black, and brown. Not only are
black people five times as likely to be incarcerated as white people, but also the lifetime
probability of incarceration for black boys born in 2001 is estimated to be thirty-two
percent compared to six percent for white boys.” (footnotes omitted)).
Low-level offenses tend to dominate criminal caseloads. See Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (2015) (“Rarely recognized
as such, the misdemeanor is in fact the paradigmatic U.S. criminal case: most cases are
misdemeanors, most of what the system does is generate minor convictions, and most
Americans who experience the criminal system do so via the petty offense process.”).
Jamelia N. Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, 109 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 5-6), https://perma.cc/GV22-ZZV2.
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Marijuana arrests are another frequently cited example. It is not just that Black
people are arrested far more often than white people for low-level marijuana
violations, despite using marijuana at similar rates.15 As Bennett Capers has
observed, it is also that marijuana prosecutions can “swing like a pendulum,”
with arrest practices wildly fluctuating in a short timespan.16 These arrest
practices reflect socially constructed metrics about who appears out of place or
is stereotyped as posing a danger, and they define the boundaries of who
belongs along racial lines.17
Racialized policing practices create the risk that police encounters will
escalate into deadly violence. Philando Castile—a thirty-two-year-old cafeteria
supervisor affectionally known as “Mr. Phil” by hundreds of school children—
was killed by a police officer during a routine traffic stop, despite evidence that
he did everything requested of him.18 In their discussion of Mr. Castile’s
killing, Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Anthony Alfieri highlighted the central
role of racial bias. The officer who killed Castile “could not see Castile as
anything more than a racial stereotype,” one that made the officer feel
“apprehensive of Castile and [led him to] read [Castile] as dangerous almost
from the beginning.”19 In the thirteen years before he was killed, Castile had
been subjected to traffic stops approximately fifty times.20
Racial disparities are particularly evident in programmatic policing
practices that subject communities of color to the repeated risk of being
15. ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 4, 17-21 (2013),

16.

17.

18.

19.
20.

https://perma.cc/X3YX-MPUM (“[O]n average, a Black person is 3.73 times more
likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than a white person, even though Blacks
and whites use marijuana at similar rates.”).
I. Bennett Capers, The Under-policed, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 589, 595-96 (2016) (noting
that in New York City in 1994 the number of marijuana possession arrests was under
two thousand but “[w]ithin six years, the number of misdemeanor marijuana arrests
per year had increased to more than 50,000, a 2760% increase”); see also Barbara Fedders,
Opioid Policing, 94 IND. L.J. 389, 406 (2019) (discussing racial disparities in drug arrests).
For a discussion of how policing practices relate to residential racial segregation, see
Monica C. Bell, Anti-segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 655 (2020) (arguing that
“there is a mutually constitutive relationship between daily practices of urban policing
and residential segregation, a relationship of mutual reproduction”); Angela OnwuachiWillig, Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being “Out of Place” from
Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1119 (2017); I. Bennett Capers,
Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 60-72 (2009); and Jeffrey Fagan &
Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 33, 87-108 (2017).
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Anthony V. Alfieri, (Re)framing Race in Civil Rights
Lawyering, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2-5), https://perma.cc/
95MP-NWK3 (reviewing HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., STONY THE ROAD: RECONSTRUCTION,
WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF JIM CROW (2019)).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
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stopped and arrested.21 Evidence from New York City’s stop-and-frisk
litigation shows how police subjected entire communities to race-based stops,
as more than 80% of those subjected to stops were racial minorities.22 Similarly,
in Ferguson, Missouri, from 2012 to 2014, “African Americans account[ed] for
85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations, and 93% of arrests made by [Ferguson
Police Department] officers, despite comprising only 67% of Ferguson’s
population.”23 The police disproportionately used force against African
Americans, with “[n]early 90% of documented force used by FPD officers” being
directed at African Americans.24 And in Los Angeles, data from July 2018 to
April 2019 showed that Black and Latino drivers were far more likely to be
subjected to searches during traffic stops than whites.25
Beyond the empirical evidence, interview-based accounts also provide a
window into how police wield their discretion. The Ferguson Report, for
instance, is riddled with interviews that document how officers singled out
vulnerable residents for harassment. In one case, a police officer accused a
thirty-two year old Black man of being a pedophile for no reason, demanded to
see his identification, and arrested him for “making a false declaration” for
stating his name was “Mike” instead of “Michael.”26 The Ferguson Report
showed how much power police have to control the narrative that emerges
from police–resident encounters. But for the Department of Justice
investigation, for instance, “Mike” would almost certainly not have had the
opportunity to explain how he was falsely accused and arrested.27
The interviews also offer further evidence that the problem of policing
goes beyond the most visible instances of violence. Rather, visible instances of
21. Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-

22.

23.
24.
25.

26.
27.

Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 165 (2015) (arguing that while
the constitutional framework for regulating stop-and-frisk practices “is based on a oneoff investigative incident, many of those who are stopped—the majority of them young
men of color—do not experience the stops as one-off incidents” and arguing that the
legal doctrine should recognize the significance of programmatic policing).
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 573-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (summarizing
“uncontested statistics” indicating that the New York City Police Department made 4.4
million stops in an eight-year period from 2004 to 2012 and that over 80% of these stops
were of racial minorities).
CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 4, 62 (2015) (often called the Ferguson Report).
Id. at 5, 62.
Ben Poston & Cindy Chang, LAPD Searches Blacks and Latinos More. But They’re Less
Likely to Have Contraband Than Whites, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019, 3:52 PM PT),
https://perma.cc/BCR9-MC9X (to locate, click “View the live page”).
CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 23, at 3, 18 (capitalization altered).
Cf. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1458-75 (2005) (explaining how defendant silencing in built into criminal law
enforcement).
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violence are reflective of systemic problems in policing and the failure of
police to serve the communities that they are supposed to protect.
II. The Need to Connect Race-Based Policing with Criminal Records
Even as recent social movements have raised awareness of unjustified
policing practices, many people remain unaware that arrests alone create
damaging criminal records.28 One reason for the disconnect may be the relative
invisibility of arrest records. As I have discussed elsewhere, arrest records can
trigger a host of consequences, such as immigration detention and deportation,
eviction from public housing, or the suspension of professional licenses.29
These processes are systemic—they are the product of governmental decisions
to invest time and resources to create, disseminate, and use criminal records.
But the consequences of an arrest may not occur until a later point in time, and
they may never be discussed by a prosecutor, defense lawyer, or judge.
Another reason for the disconnect may be the widely employed
framework of collateral consequences of criminal conviction. The collateralconsequences framework has done much to advance our collective
understanding that penalties like deportation can function as a “secret
sentence.”30 But the term itself is amorphous. As Jenny Roberts has argued, the
doctrinal divide between “direct” consequences and “collateral” consequences is
“mythical,” because “even consequences that seem to go to the heart of criminal
punishment” such as total prison time served may be deemed collateral.31 Some
commentators have used the term “informal” consequences or “invisible
punishments” rather than the term “collateral,” in order to signal that civil
28. For selected scholarship discussing the impact of criminal records, including arrest

records, see, for example, Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing
Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 556 (2016) (discussing how “individual cases
are dutifully recorded and memorialized” in a way that “would not have been possible
or useful” prior to technological changes); Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L.
REV. 987, 989 (2019); and Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839, 890
(2019).
29. See generally Jain, Arrests, supra note 3.
30. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 700 (2002).
31. Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670,
679-80 (2008) (arguing that the direct–collateral consequences distinction does not
track penal versus non-penal sanctions, because, for instance, “in some circuits a
defendant may be sentenced in a federal criminal case without knowing that his federal
sentence will not begin until he has finished serving a state sentence” and that “[t]he
fact that the defendant will thus serve more prison time on the two cases than he
expected when he pleaded guilty is deemed ‘collateral’ ” while “[i]n other circuits, it is
considered ‘direct’ ”).
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penalties are just as weighty as the formal sentence.32 Commentators also
employ the term collateral consequences in different ways. Some refer to
government-imposed penalties such as voting bans. Others employ the term
more broadly so as to encompass the barriers to finding work that job seekers
experience as a result of their criminal records.33
Precisely because the problem of criminal records is multifaceted, reforms
that aim to address one aspect of the problem may obscure others. Focusing on
collateral consequences of convictions risks obscuring that the problem is not
limited to conviction. If we overlook the role of arrests, we perpetuate an
idealized but ultimately inaccurate narrative about how the criminal process
operates. In this idealized narrative, lawyers can identify particular laws—such
as those that disenfranchise felons or that require noncitizens to be deported
after a criminal conviction—and determine whether a criminal conviction will
trigger a particular consequence. But in practice, penalties stemming from a
criminal record are ubiquitous. Those with criminal records may never realize
the full impact of their contact with the criminal justice system, because they
have no ability to track how their record is used.
Relatedly, a focus on forgiveness or redemption in policy reform may
obscure the role of race-based policing as the primary reason why some
criminal records are created in the first place. During the Obama
Administration, Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan
put it this way in an appeal to housing providers to employ discretion in favor
of renting to tenants with criminal records: “[T]his is an Administration that
believes in the importance of second chances—that people who have paid their
debt to society deserve the opportunity to become productive citizens and
caring parents, to set the past aside and embrace the future.”34 The language of
“second chances” for those who have already “paid a debt to society” does not
account for those for whom the criminal record itself is unjustified. The issue is
not simply that those with criminal records deserve a second chance. It is that,

32. Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y

963, 970 (2013) (using the term “informal, non-legal consequences”); Wayne A. Logan,
Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2013) (describing informal
consequences as “arising independently of specific legal authority” as opposed to formal
collateral consequences); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal
Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL.
L. REV. 479, 494-96 (2005) (using the term “invisible punishments”).
33. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2265, 2268,
2273-74 (2018) (explaining how barriers to finding work function as a collateral
consequence, including when imposed by private employers).
34. Letter from Shaun Donovan, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev.; and Sandra B.
Henriquez, Assistant Sec’y for Pub. & Indian Hous., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban. Dev., to
PHA Executive Director 2 (June 17, 2011), https://perma.cc/NT9B-2N4G.
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due to unjustified underlying policing practices, some arrested individuals
never had a first chance.
A focus on the impact of a criminal record also invites a particular set of
comparisons between those with criminal records and those without them. But
it is important to recognize that even among equivalent record-holders, racial
minorities may experience worse outcomes. It is not just that overpoliced
racial minorities are disproportionately likely to have criminal records.
Rather, the mark of a criminal record itself may be more harmful for racial
minorities.
In the context of employment, studies have shown how criminal records
can amplify underlying race-based discrimination. In a seminal 2001 study,
sociologist Devah Pager found that criminal records disproportionately
blocked applicants from obtaining access to entry-level jobs across the board,
but that they had more of an impact on Black applicants.35 Pager matched
Black and white testers with comparable qualifications for entry-level jobs,
and she examined how both race and a criminal record—a nonviolent drug
conviction and eighteen months of incarceration—affected who received a
callback interview.36 The study showed cascading levels of race-based
discrimination. First, when designing the study, Black testers had to complete
200 audits to receive a number of callbacks comparable to that white testers
received after 150 audits.37 And while all applicants experienced worse job
prospects because of a criminal record, white testers fared better than similarly
situated Black testers.38 Ultimately, Black applicants without a criminal record
had the same employment prospects as white applicants with a criminal
record.39
Pager’s study also showed that employers did not explain how the presence
of a criminal record affected their decisions. For instance, employers would
claim that they would be in touch after doing a reference check, but they
would never actually check the reference.40 Applicants who took employers at
their word might infer that they were not given the job because of a poor
reference check, rather than recognizing that the problem was the criminal
record.
35. PAGER, MARKED, supra note 4, at 91.
36. Pager sought to minimize the impact of soft characteristics like personality by

37.
38.
39.
40.

measuring the likelihood of receiving a callback, rather than the likelihood of actually
getting the job. Id. at 61 (explaining the “focus only on this initial stage of the
employment process”).
Id. at 60.
Id. at 69, 90-91.
Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 66.
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An important 2014 study of “ban the box” reforms by Amanda Agan and
Sonja Starr also showed how racial discrimination, combined with the use of
criminal records, forecloses job opportunities.41 The study examined racial
discrimination in entry-level jobs before and after legislation was rolled out in
New York and New Jersey that barred employers from asking about criminal
history in an initial employment application. Prior to ban-the-box reforms,
“white applicants received 7% more callbacks than similar black applicants, but
after [those reforms] this gap grew to 43%.”42 The results showed that ban-thebox reforms appeared to help white applicants with criminal records, who
“saw a substantial increase in callbacks.”43 But they had the opposite effect on
Black applicants, who experienced a “substantial drop” in callbacks.44 As Agan
and Starr discuss, this pattern suggests that employers stereotyped Black
applicants as having criminal records when those employers were barred from
asking about records on the initial application form.45
These studies show how racial discrimination magnifies the impact of a
criminal record. The Fair Housing Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 protect against racial discrimination in housing and employment,
respectively, including disparate impact and disparate treatment.46 Courts
have held that that a blanket prohibition on renting to or employing those
with criminal records can constitute unlawful discrimination.47 And where
employers or housing providers have stated policies regarding criminal
records, those policies need to serve a legitimate purpose. As the Third Circuit
held in a widely cited decision, El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority, Title VII “require[s] that the [hiring] policy under review accurately
distinguish between applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk [because
41. Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination: A

Field Experiment, 133 Q. J. ECON. 191 (2018).
Id. at 195.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id. (“This pattern suggests that when employers lack individualized information, they
tend to generalize that black applicants, but not white applicants, are likely to have
records.”).
46. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§2604-3606; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§2000e to 2000e-17.
47. See, e.g., Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077, 1078, 1080-81 (D. Conn. 1977) (finding an
equal protection violation where a Connecticut statute barred those with felony
convictions from working as licensed detectives, because the statute was overly broad,
made no distinction between different felons, and made an irrational distinction
between convicted felons and convicted misdemeanants); see also Dallan F. Flake, When
Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: Employment Discrimination Against Ex-offenders, 93 WASH.
U. L. REV. 45, 70-71 (2015) (discussing constitutional and statutory doctrines related to
employment bans based on criminal records).
42.
43.
44.
45.
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of their criminal record] and those that do not.”48 At issue in El was whether a
formal policy that “disallowed hiring anyone with, among other things, a
violent criminal conviction,” discriminated against an African American
employee with a forty-seven-year-old homicide conviction that had been
entered when he was fifteen.49 The plaintiff had been terminated shortly after
his employer did a background check; the timing of the termination decision,
and the employer’s explanation that the termination was based on the
background check, gave him the information necessary to file a complaint
alleging unlawful discrimination.50 But all too often, prospective tenants or
applicants are kept in the dark about the impact of their records, especially
when they are denied access to a job or rental housing in the first place.
Employers and housing providers who conduct criminal record checks are
generally under no obligation to explain how a criminal record affected their
decisionmaking, nor are they required to adopt and publish criminal-record
policies. In the absence of visibility into how criminal records are used, we lack
even the most basic tools to surface, and ultimately to redress, race-based
discrimination.
III. Recognizing the Negative Credential of a Criminal Record
A racial reckoning in policing requires connecting unjustified arrests to
the creation of lasting criminal records. A marking or credentialing
framework offers a way to conceptualize how criminal records both magnify
and conceal race-based discrimination. One way of recognizing the work that
the negative credential of an arrest is doing is to disaggregate the criminal
arrest and record-creation process into four stages: (1) the physical restraint on
freedom (the arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes), (2) the creation of a
criminal record (the credentialing process), (3) the dissemination of criminal
records (dissemination of the credential), and (4) adverse decisions based on
criminal records (the impact of the credential). Reckoning with race in the
criminal justice system requires recognizing that the problem is not just the
police: It is with a legal regime that entrenches racial subordination through
criminal records.
We need a new shared vocabulary about what an arrest is today. An arrest
is something more permanent and more consequential than it has been in the
past. For Fourth Amendment purposes, courts have at times relied on historic
arrest practices to justify contemporary arrest practices. In Atwater, the Court
48. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2007).
49. Id. at 235-37.
50. Id. at 235-36 (noting that the offer was contingent on a successful criminal background

check).
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drew an analogy between a custodial arrest for a misdemeanor seatbelt
violation and historical practices of making low-level warrantless arrests. The
Court likened an arrest for a seatbelt violation, for instance, to a sixteenthcentury statute that “authorized peace officers to arrest persons playing
‘unlawful game[s]’ like bowling, tennis, dice, and cards.”51 The Court observed
that “early- and mid- 19th-century decisions expressly sustain[ed] . . . laws
authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not
involving any breach of the peace.”52 The Court’s reasoning implies that lowlevel arrests today are equivalent to low-level arrests that were historically
made for crimes such as “bowling, tennis, dice and cards.”
This analogy is not sustainable if criminal records are taken into account.
In the past, a night watchman’s decision to make an arrest for a low-level
activity involved a government-imposed restraint on freedom and had the
potential for stigma. But today, that stigma is formalized through the creation
and dissemination of a criminal record. Even if the restraint on freedom is the
same, the overall impact of the arrest is weightier because of the record.
Common sense and political accountability cannot work as checks on how
criminal records are created if police, prosecutors, and lawmakers do not look
at the consequences of a criminal record—or if they lack a way to identify what
the full consequences of a record might be. In cases where an arrest record has
more to do with biases in policing than underlying moral blameworthiness,
the question should be why this credential is being created in the first place.
The simplest way to avoid creating unjustified marks is to reduce reliance
on criminal arrests themselves, such as by decriminalizing conduct that does
not reflect underlying moral culpability or by reducing the scope of policing
practices.53 This approach dovetails with other proposals to fundamentally
change policing.54 Reducing criminal arrest practices altogether offers a way to
be more nuanced about the types of credentials the criminal justice system
creates.
In addition, we should consider how to sever the process of criminal arrest
from the creation of a criminal record. The progressive prosecution movement
51. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 334-35 (2001) (alteration in original)

(quoting An Acte for Mayntenance of Artyllarie and Debarringe of Unlawful Games,
33 Hen. 8 c. 9, §§ 11-16 (1541)).
52. Id. at 342.
53. Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 320 (2016) (“Given that arrests
are costly deprivations of liberty, they should, as a normative matter, be imposed only
when they serve a significant state interest, when the risk of harm is not grossly
disproportionate to that interest, and when they are used fairly.”).
54. This argument appears in the literature on over-criminalization, as well as in literature
on defunding the police. See Jessica M. Eaglin, To “Defund” the Police, 73 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 120 (2021).
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is often associated with prosecutors who decline to pursue charges for lowlevel arrests that disproportionately burden communities of color. Prosecutors
who choose not to pursue charges can avoid creating the mark of a conviction,
but they cannot prevent the creation of a negative credential altogether.
Structural changes in when prosecutors engage in screening might prevent
arrests from turning into criminal records. Adam Gershowitz has argued for
adopting this model, advocating for early prosecutorial screening, prior to the
booking process.55 This type of intervention offers a way to disaggregate the
physical experience of being arrested from the creation of a criminal record.
Although much depends on how prosecutors exercise their discretion, taking a
prebooking approach to prosecutorial screening could prevent unjustified or
overbroad arrests from being formalized into a criminal record.
In addition to restricting when the mark of a criminal record is created,
the government should reduce the visibility of such marks. Statutes that
prohibit sharing of arrest records, or that provide for automatic expungement
of criminal records, have the potential to mitigate the impact of a criminal
record. But these types of reforms have been underutilized because of
unnecessary eligibility requirements.56 When those with criminal records are
required to affirmatively seek relief, there is a significant “uptake gap.”57 As
Colleen Chien has shown, “the informational and bureaucratic hoops that one
must jump through to get their second chances are often extensive and costly,”
which results in an enormous gap between those who are eligible for relief
such as expungement and those who actually apply for and receive such
relief.58 Less than 20% of those who are eligible for expungement of
convictions have applied for relief.59 Rather than asking the record holder to
present grounds for relief, the primary question should be whether there is a
good reason for making the mark visible in the first place.60
55. Adam M. Gershowitz, Justice on the Line: Prosecutorial Screening Before Arrest, 2019 U. ILL.

56.

57.

58.
59.
60.

L. REV. 833, 837, 869 (pointing to Harris County, Texas as a case study and arguing that
this model would be feasible for other jurisdictions). See also Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal
Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1126, 1172 (2013) (discussing the “direct-filing” model in Harris County, Texas).
See 50-State Comparison: Expungement, Sealing & Other Record Relief, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (updated Mar. 2021), https://perma.cc/52B7-D4AS (offering a
fifty-state comparison of requirements for criminal record relief).
J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An Empirical Study,
133 HARV. L. REV. 2460, 2466, 2501-10 (2020) (determining that “only 6.5% of all eligible
individuals [in Michigan] receive an expungement within five years of the date at
which they first qualify for one”).
Colleen Chien, America’s Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gap, 119 MICH. L. REV. 519,
540-41 (2020).
Id. at 555.
See Jain, Proportionality, supra note 3, at 978 (arguing for examining “whether there is a
compelling penal rationale for the penalty, rather than whether the defendant can
footnote continued on next page

176

The Mark of Policing
73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 162 (2021)

In addition, reckoning with racial discrimination in policing requires
acknowledging that the problem is not just with the police. It is with a host of
actors that rely on criminal records in discriminatory ways. Employers who
support police reform—who believe that policing practices reflect race-based
discrimination—should consider how criminal records close the door to work
along racial lines. They should also be willing to adopt written policies
explaining how they employ records, and they should be transparent about
information such as whether they check records, why they do so, and how
criminal records affect hiring practices.
Decisions about how and when to rely on criminal records, however,
should not be left entirely to the discretion of employers or housing providers.
In policing, as well as in a host of other areas, discretionary decisions are rife
with the potential for discrimination. In a 2002 decision, Department of Housing
& Urban Development v. Rucker, the Supreme Court erred in conceptualizing
discretionary decisionmaking as the solution to overbroad uses of criminal
records.61 In Rucker, the Court upheld the eviction of Perlie Rucker, her
daughter, two grandchildren, and great-grandchildren after the daughter’s offpremises drug-related arrest.62 Rucker argued that her eviction violated her
due-process rights given that she regularly searched her daughter’s room for
evidence of drugs and had no ability to control or prevent the conduct of her
daughter well outside her apartment.63 The Court unanimously held that there
was no due-process violation, explaining that Rucker had been granted proper
notice of the eviction and that the housing authority was properly “acting as a
landlord of property that it owns, invoking a clause in a lease to which
respondents have agreed and which Congress has expressly required.”64
A marking framework offers a way of recognizing why the arrests of
Rucker’s adult daughter, Gelinda, and her adult son, Michael (who listed
Rucker’s address as his own, even though he did not live with her) triggered
the eviction.65 Rucker’s eviction was not a collateral consequence of a criminal
conviction—the eviction was discretionary and could be triggered by arrest
alone. In Rucker, the key question should not have been whether discretion was
available, but how police and the housing authority had employed their

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

demonstrate hardship or good character”); see also Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66
EMORY L.J. 1315, 1386-87 (2017) (discussing how “the criminal justice system’s
discretionary nature has been linked historically to its disproportionate impact on
poor people of color” and arguing for making relief mechanisms automatic rather than
discretionary).
Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002).
See Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 WL 345403, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 1998).
Id.; see also Jain, Arrests, supra note 3, at 836-37 (discussing Rucker).
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 135-36.
Joint Appendix at 13, Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (Nos. 00-1770, 00-1781), 2001 WL 34093958.
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discretion. Rucker’s complaint showed the reach of low-level police arrest
activity. According to the complaint, Gelinda was arrested three blocks from
Rucker’s residence after she was observed committing an open container
violation.66 Michael, Rucker’s son, was arrested approximately six months
later when a police officer observed him “loitering at a bus stop with a second
man.”67 Searches of Gelinda and Michael revealed that each was carrying a
rock of cocaine.68 These facts, which were not noted in the Supreme Court’s
decision, show how policing practices played a key role in triggering the
eviction. In upholding the eviction, the Court referred to the need to give
housing authorities the discretion to evict tenants who “cannot control drug
crime, or other criminal activities by a household member which threaten [the]
health or safety of other residents.”69 The Court did not discuss the lack of
safeguards in place to protect tenants, however, including in cases where there
was little apparent link to the health or safety of other residents.
Rucker’s eviction was the product of a host of discretionary decisions,
including a decision to arrest, to formalize the arrest into a credential, to notify
the housing authority of the arrest, and ultimately to pursue eviction. Any
discretion public-housing authorities ultimately exercised was responsive to
policing practices.
Discretion cannot be a meaningful check against racial bias where there is
significant information asymmetry about how criminal records are used. In the
context of employment or housing, we know far too little about how criminal
records relate to racial discrimination. Michael and Gelinda likely had no idea
that their arrests would lead to their mother’s eviction months after the fact.
Nor would most other arrested individuals in similar circumstances.
Reconceptualizing the role of criminal records—including by restricting the
use and dissemination of certain records; by engaging in robust enforcement of
antidiscrimination law; and by rendering visible how employers, housing
providers, and others rely on criminal records—should be part of the project of
reckoning with the ongoing impact of policing.
Conclusion
As we collectively reckon with the role of race in the criminal justice
system, it is critical to recognize how police wield enormous power to create
the mark of a criminal record. Criminal records—their creation, distribution,
and use—play a hidden role in formalizing social stigma. In a world where
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133 (internal quotations omitted).
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arrests create markers that last long after the criminal case is complete, the key
question is why and how we permit race-based policing to live on and
potentially to affect many aspects of an arrested individual’s life. Racial
reckoning in criminal justice requires recognizing that the problem of policing
is not confined to the police; a host of other actors rely on criminal records in
ways that entrench inequality. A key question should be whether and when a
police officer’s decision to arrest should automatically serve a credentialing
function in the first place.
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